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Abstract
This research examines China’s persistent effort to promote intellectual property rights (IPR) since
the 1980s. Laws of intellectual property were among the first batch of legislations in China’s market
reform. Since the mid-1980s, the state propaganda apparatus launched nationwide campaigns in fiveyear cycles to “educate” Chinese people on the Party’s new market-oriented law and policy, including
laws of IPR. When intellectual property became core state policy in the 2000s, new initiatives
emerged under law promotion campaigns to “raise awareness” of intellectual property. Starting the
late 2000s, the promotion of IPR became stand-alone endeavors devoted to an innovation-friendly
“culture” of intellectual property that facilitated compliance with the law and promoted industrial
growth in cultural and media sectors.
The notion of “IPR culture” played a key role in governmental promotion endeavors after China
developed its national IPR strategy in the mid-2000s. In official discourse, “IPR culture” is
instrumental and serves to shape mind-sets and regulate behaviors. It seeks to extensively use the
Leninist media system to impose top-down pre-packaged understanding of intellectual property.
While engaging actively with Western theories and corporate practices, IPR propaganda in China
marginalizes and represses bottom-up challenges to the official stance in protection of private cultural
property.
China’s intellectual property propaganda campaigns are part of the state’s efforts to legitimate and
facilitate the market-oriented reform. Since the late 1970s, the market reform proceeded side-by-side
with ruthless repression of bottom-up resistance. IPR stood out in the state’s reform scheme at a time
when China’s (re)insertion into global capitalist political economy took place concurrently with
communication industries playing a key role to propel growth and IPR systems serving as the
cornerstone for the market. The state-led campaign to engineer a pro-market IPR culture manifests
China’s adoption of the logic of the global IPR regime, which will only subject China to the
hegemonic power of Western IPR discourse and distance the state’s cultural project from grassroots
dynamics of meaning making.
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Introduction
Intellectual property rights (IPR) have caused significant tensions between the
West and China over the past few decades. Researchers have attributed the
problems of IPR in China to a number of reasons, notably the Confucian tradition,
Chinese culture, and socialist ideology.1 This research seeks to contribute to an
understanding of those tensions by documenting and examining massive and
persistent media and propaganda campaigns to promote IPR in China. I argue that
China’s IPR propaganda rose rapidly in influence and status when China
embraced intellectual property as a core developmental policy. The ultimate goal
is to manufacture an “IPR culture (zhishi chanquan wenhua)” that shapes
mindsets and affects behaviors through top-down media campaigns that
disseminate pro-market ideas. By internalizing the logic of the global IPR regime,
the promotion of IPR in China serves to sustain rather than challenge the
dominant political economic order in global cultural and informational sectors.
The promotion of IPR in China is noteworthy in many regards. It is part of
China’s persistent media and propaganda endeavor to promote state policy and
reform agenda. Born out of pufa (mass legal education) campaigns, IPR
promotional projects are cultural attempts to achieve political economic goals.
Meanwhile, IPR as proprietarized control is a cornerstone system that facilitates
commodification in cultural and information sectors. Thus, IPR promotional
campaigns entail two different interpretations of “culture” simultaneously: they
seek to intervene into “culture” as dynamic processes of meaning-making in order
to feed “culture” as raw materials to cycles of capital reproduction. In addition,
extensive IPR propaganda demonstrates how Leninist propagandist media are
1

William Alford, To Steal a Book is an Elegant Offense: Intellectual Property Law in
Chinese Civilization (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1995); Michel Oksenberg,
Pitman B. Potter, and William B. Abnett, “Advancing Intellectual Property Rights:
Information Technologies and the Course of Economic Development in China,” NBR
Analysis 7, no. 4 (1996): 1-35.
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employed to promote pro-market ideas. The counterintuitive combination of
media structures born out of China’s anti-capitalist past and current media
messages used to promote an IPR system that recognizes only “knowledge to be
used and applied in an endless chain of commodification”2 gives rise to tensions
and conflicts in IPR propaganda. Last but not the least, IPR in China, as well as in
major Western countries, is not just about cultural and information sectors, but is
at the core of national development and economic growth. The implications of the
cultural work of IPR reach wide and deep into the contemporary global political
economy.
This article first provides a brief account of China's persistent efforts to
educate its population on the legal system by means of pufa campaigns. It then
discusses the Chinese state's adoption of IPR as a core developmental policy and
the intensified promotion and propaganda activities that resulted. The next
sections analyze the content and context of “IPR culture” and the conflicts in the
cultural work of intellectual property. The conclusion argues that China’s IPR
cultural project may in effect run against the developmental goal that the state
envisions.

Mass legal education in contemporary China
The late 1970s witnessed profound changes in Chinese society, politics, and
economy. New party and state leadership under Deng Xiaoping launched a series
of market-oriented policies that significantly differed from previous decades. The
notion of “rule of law” became prominent during the reform era, and a new legal
system was built up as part of the new governance structure. The party
propaganda apparatus became the propagator of reform initiatives and launched
massive campaigns to educate the Chinese population on the new legal order.
In contrast to the successive mass movements that had taken place in
previous decades, the new leadership in China sought to maintain a stable
political and social order. The Market Reform was prefaced by the repression of
grassroots political challenges in the late 1970s, notably the “Xidan Democracy
Wall (Xidan minzhu qiang)”in Beijing. The notion of “socialist democracy” in the
2

Laikwan Pang, Creativity and Its Discontents: China's Creative Industries and
Intellectual Property Rights Offenses (Durham: Duke University Press, 2012), 225.
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reform era emphasized not bottom-up political participation, but stabilization of
the state bureaucracy.3 Lawmaking in the late 1970s catered to political agendas
by crafting the Criminal Law and the Criminal Procedural Law in the first batch
of legislation in the reform era. Promulgated together in 1978, they served to
protect the political and social orders by reinstating the sole authority of state
organs in the political and public sphere.
Another aspect of legal development was the creation of laws to serve market
and economic activities. Under the centrally-planned economy in the Maoist era,
issues of private proprietorship, economic contracts, industrial investment, and
intellectual property had been insignificant or were handled as political and public
matters through governmental channels. The development of legal instruments to
regulate the market was an urgent and important item on the reformers' agenda.
To be sure, this was not an easy task. In the face of political and social resistance,
as well as conflicts between bureaucratic agencies and interests, some key statutes
including the Property Law had to wait until the late 2000s. Nevertheless,
reformers managed to enact a number of market-serving statutes in the late 1970s
and early 1980s. These include the China-Foreign Joint Venture Enterprise Law in
1979, the Economic Contract Law in 1981, and the Trademark Law in 1982, all of
which predated the 1982 Constitution that set the politico-legal framework for
contemporary China.
With a number of new laws and regulations in place, propagation for a new
“socialist legal system” gradually gained momentum. As Deng Xiaoping once put
it: “What is important to the strengthening of the legal system is education. The
fundamental issue is about educating people.”4 Routine legal education started in
the late 1970s,5 and became institutionalized and coordinated nation-wide during
the mid-1980s.6 In 1986, the first five-year pufa program was set in motion.
3

4

5

6

Maurice Meisner, Mao's China and After: A History of the People's Republic (New York:
Free Press, 1999).
Deng Xiaoping, quoted in “China's Top Legislator Calls for ‘Upsurge in Propaganda’ on
Legal System,” BBC Monitoring Asia Pacific - Political Supplied by BBC Worldwide
Monitoring, April 24, 2011.
Ronald J. Troyer, “Publicizing the New Laws: The Public Legal Education Campaign,” in
Social Control in the People's Republic of China, eds. Ronald J. Troyer, John P. Clark,
and Dean G. Rojek (New York: Praeger, 1995), 70-83.
Lina Xia, “Wunian Pufa de Youlai [The Origin of Five Year Pufa Programs],”
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Literally meaning to “popularize law,” pufa programs were run by the Propaganda
Department of the Party and the Ministry of Justice in an effort to educate every
Chinese citizen on the legal system. This was a massive endeavor that involved a
number of governmental agencies and judicial organs including the court, the
procuratorate, as well as the police. Pufa campaigns reached widely into
state-owned enterprises, schools, the military, as well as the countryside. 7
According to the Ministry of Justice, more than three hundred million people
received legal education during the first year of pufa (1986). 8 During the
five-year cycle from 1986 to 1990, about seven hundred million people took part
in pufa activities.9
In the following decades, pufa was integrated into China’s five-year plans of
national development and was conducted also in five-year cycles. It always
involved high-profile propaganda campaigns, in which state-controlled media
outlets, including newspapers, television, radio, and later the Internet all devoted
spaces to disseminate legal knowledge. Governmental organs and state-owned
corporations organized study sessions for their employees, and public activities
were held, including public lectures and seminars as well as propaganda booths
and tables in the streets. In the 2000s and after, pufa continued to play an
important role in China’s political and social sphere. In 2001, a notice by the
Communist Party’s Central Committee and the State Council called mass legal
education “an important legal guarantee for the implementation of the 10th
Five-Year Plan.”10 At the onset of the sixth five-year pufa program in 2011,
China’s top legislator called for “a new upsurge in propaganda and education on

NPC.gov.cn, 2016, http://www.npc.gov.cn/npc/zgrdzz/2016-05/30/content_1990639.htm.
7 Troyer, “Publicizing the New Laws”; Xia, “The Origin.”
8 Yu Zou, “Guanyu 1986 Nian Guanche Shishi Quanguo Renda Changweihui Zai Gongmin
zhong JIben Puji Falv Changshi de Jueyi de Qingkuang de Baogao [Report on the
Implementation of the NPC Standing Committee's Decision to Popularize Basic Legal
Knowledge
among
Citizens],”
NPC.gov.cn,
1987,
http://www.npc.gov.cn/wxzl/gongbao/2000-12/14/content_5001905.htm.
9 Xia, “The Origin.”
10 “China Issues Notice on Launching Propaganda, Education on Legal System,” BBC
Monitoring Asia Pacific - Political Supplied by BBC Worldwide Monitoring, May 27,
2001.
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legal system.”11
The emphases of pufa programs always change alongside party and state
policy shifts. The first five-year program starting in 1986 focused on the so-called
“ten laws and one regulation (shi fa yi tiaoli),” including the Constitution,
Criminal Law, Criminal Procedural Law, the General Principles of Civil Law, and
the Economic Contract law, all of which are key legal instruments that constituted
the policy turn in the reform era.12 When market reform deepened in the 1990s,
the second five-year pufa program “centered on economic development (weirao
jingji jianshe zhege zhongxin)” and focused on legal issues pertaining to “the
establishment of the market economy system (shichang jingji tizhi jianli).13 After
China’s accession to the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 2001, WTO rules
and regulations became new priorities in pufa.14 Laws of intellectual property,
while part of the first five-year program 1986-1990, 15 stood out only after
China’s accession to the WTO and significantly rose in prominence in pufa
campaigns after China formally adopted IPR as a key developmental strategy.
China’s embrace of intellectual property
Contrary to general assumptions, the Chinese government has paid significant
attention to intellectual property since the early 1980s. Key IPR statutes,
including the Patent Law, Copyright Law, and Trademark Law, were early on the
agenda of Chinese reformers. The Trademark Law and the Patent Law was made
in 1982 and 1984, respectively, before the U.S. first expressed IPR concerns to

“China’s Top Legislator.”
12 Troyer, “Publicizing the New Laws”; Xia, “The Origin.”
13 Yang Xiao, “Guanyu Dierge Wunian Pufa Guihua Shishi Qingkuang de Baogao [Report
on the Implementation of the Second Five-Year Pufa Program],” NPC.gov.cn, 1993,
http://www.npc.gov.cn/wxzl/gongbao/2000-12/28/content_5003013.htm.
14 Yishun Xiao, “Jiangqiang Zhishi Chanquan Xuanchuan Nuli Wei Zhishi Chanquan de
Chuangzao yu Baohu Fuwu [Strengthen IPR Legal Propaganda to Serve the Creation and
Protection of IPR],” in Zhishi Chanquan yu Gaige Kaifang 30 Nian [IPR and 30 Years of
Reform and Opening Up], ed. Editorial Board (Beijing: Zhishi Chanquan Chubanshe,
2008), 199-208.
15 Ibid.
11
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China in 1985.16 The making of the Copyright Law was also driven by domestic
agendas until the late 1980s. The law was on the verge of passage in 1987, but
was stalled because of inter-agency disagreements on its impact on educational
and research sectors.17 Upon reentering the legislative pipeline, it collided with
intense American pressure that resulted in a Memorandum of Understanding
(MOU) between the two countries in May 1989. The Copyright Law was finally
promulgated in 1990. It incorporated China’s concessions in the 1989 MOU and
bore distinct marks of U.S. pressure.18
Through the 1990s, the U.S. forced China into three IPR agreements through
intense trade threats. The U.S. Trade Representative claimed to have had 18
meetings in 11 months with the Chinese government in the mid-1990s, “clearly
the most intense set of meetings we have ever had with any country on any trade
agreement in American history.” 19 U.S. trade threats weakened after China’s
accession to the WTO in 2001 due to WTO rules, as well as to the fact that China
had already established an up-to-date intellectual property system.20 Domestic
16

Regarding early U.S. communication with China on matters of IPR, See Warren H.
Maruyama, “U.S.-China IPR Negotiations: Trade, Intellectual Property and Rule of Law
in a Global Economy,” in Chinese Intellectual Property Law and Practice, eds. Mark A.
Cohen, A. Elizabeth Bang, and Stephanie J. Mitchell (Hague: Kluwer Law International,
1999), 165-212; Peter K. Yu, The Second Coming of Intellectual Property Rights in China
(New York: Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law, Yeshiva University, 2002).
17 Dong Han, “How the Copyright Law Was (Not) Made: Intellectual Property and China’s
Contested Integration with Global Capitalism,” International Journal of Communication
8, (2014), 1516-1535.
18 Han, “How the Copyright Law Was (Not) Made”; Mingde Li, Tebie 301 Tiaokuan yu
Zhongmei Zhishi Chanquan Zhengduan [Special 301 and Sino-US Intellectual Property
Disputes] (Beijing: Shehui Kexue Wenxian Chubanshe, 2000).
19 The U.S.-China intellectual property rights agreement and related trade issues: Joint
hearing before the Subcommittees on International Economic Policy and Trade and Asia
and the Pacific of the Committee on International Relations, House of Representatives,
and the Subcommittee of East Asian and Pacific Affairs of the Committee on foreign
Relations Senate, One Hundred Fourth Congress, second session, March 7, 1996
(Washington D.C.: USGPO, 1997), 7.
20 Peter K. Yu, “TRIPS Enforcement and Developing Countries,” American University
International Law Review 26, (2011), 727-782.
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initiatives started to regain control on IPR development. The idea of a national
IPR strategy (guojia zhishi chanquan zhanlue) began to circulate among Chinese
political leaders since the turn of the century. In 2005, formal efforts to draft the
strategy kicked off with the establishment of the Leadership Group (lingdao
xiaozu) for the Making of National IPR Strategy, a high-rank inter-agency
organization that enlisted the heads of 28 governmental organs ranging from
intellectual property and trade regulators to strategic planners like the
Development and Reform Commission.21 In 2008, the State Council passed the
National IPR Strategy Outline (guojia zhishi chanquan zhanlue gangyao) and
circulated it all over the country.
The National IPR Strategy Outline (hereinafter “Strategy Outline”) sees
intellectual property not as sectorial regulation but as a key component of China’s
development and transformation. It argues that “knowledge resources (zhishi
ziyuan)” are of strategic importance, and that IPR is the “foundational system
(jiben zhidu).” It further points out that IPR is becoming the “core element (hexin
yaosu)” of international competition and the key to build a “creative nation
(chuangxinxing guojia).” Its recognition of IPR’s central role in the national
developmental strategy set the tone for policymaking in the following decade. In
2015, two policy documents further elaborated on the importance of IPR. The
Several Opinions on Deepening System Reform and Accelerating the
Implementation of Creativity-Driven Developmental Strategy, issued by the
Communist Party’s Central Committee and the State Council, argued that the
creativity-driven strategy is to let the market determine the allocation of resources
and provide strict protection of intellectual property. The Several Opinions on
Accelerating the Construction of an IPR-Strong Nation, issued by the State
Council, aims to create China’s “new IPR advantages (zhishi chanquan xin
youshi)” in international competition and to build a world-class, IPR-strong nation
(zhishi chanquan qiangguo).
China’s embrace of IPR has its roots in China’s legal reform, media
marketization, and reshuffling of social classes over the past few decades.22 In the
context of accelerated economic restructuring in the late 2000s and 2010s, IPR
Office for the Leadership Group for the Making of National IPR Strategy, “On the
Making of National IPR Strategy,” in IPR Yearbook 2005 ed. IPR Yearbook Editorial
Board (Beijing: Zhishi Chanquan Chubanshe, 2007), 35-36.
22 Han, “How the Copyright Law Was (Not) Made.”
21
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policy rose further in prominence by closely aligning with the state’s
developmental goal. On the one hand, the Strategy Outline coincided with the
global crisis in 2008, an important catalyst for accelerated economic restructuring
in present-day China.23 After years of preparation, it was formally published and
circulated in June, right before the financial meltdown hit global news headlines
in fall 2008. On the other hand, decades of market-oriented reform and
ideological shifts have paved the way for intellectual property to assume a central
role in China’s cultural and information industries, which have come to the core
of the economic restructuring scheme. In 2017, the State Council promulgated the
National IPR Protection and Utilization Plan for the Thirteenth Five-Year Plan,
formally recognizing IPR as a key developmental project and a top policy
priority.24

The Propaganda Week and intensified IPR promotion
IPR has been an important part of pufa as early as 1986, when the Patent Law and
the Trademark Law were both included in mass legal education.25 At the turn of
the century, IPR propaganda became a stand-alone project. After the Strategy
Outline of 2008, the promotion of intellectual property increased significantly in
scale and intensity and placed significant emphasis on the creation of “IPR culture
(zhishi chaquan wenhua).”
Under the larger framework of pufa, China started to launch annual IPR
promotional campaigns in the early 2000s on the World Intellectual Property Day
(April 26). Starting from 2004, the one-day event was expanded into week-long
activities known as the IPR Propaganda Week (zhishi chanquan xuanchuanzhou).
It often involves large-scale public activities in big cities across the country,
including exhibitions, open-house events, public lectures, seminars, information
23

Yu Hong, Networking China: The Digital Transformation of the Chinese Economy (Urbana:
University of Illinois Press, 2017); Dan Schiller, Digital Depression: Information
Technology and Economic Crisis (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 2014).
24 Xinhua News Agency, “State Council Promulgated the National IPR Protection and
Utilization Plan for the Thirteenth Five-Year Plan [Guowuyuan Yinfa Shisanwu Zhishi
Chanquan
Yunyong
he
Baohu
Guihua],”
Gov.cn,
2017,
http://www.gov.cn/xinwen/2017-01/13/content_5159586.htm.
25 Xiao, “Strengthen IPR Legal Propaganda.”
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booths in the streets, on-site intellectual property consultations, and so on. The
IPR Propaganda Week in 2005 hosted over 900 seminars, put up 600,000 posters,
distributed 1.2 million propaganda materials, and conducted 350,000
consultations nationwide.26 In 2008, the Propaganda Week staged more than 810
events across the country, and more than 1.3 million people were directly
involved. 27 After the Strategy Outline of 2008, the IPR Propaganda Week
received a major upgrade. In 2009, 24 governmental agencies took part in the
Propaganda Week, almost twice as much as before. According to the China
Intellectual Property News (zhishi chanquan bao), published by the State
Intellectual Property Office (SIPO), such wide participation by governmental
organs helped to “infuse the concept of IPR into almost all economic sectors.”28
In terms of scale, content, and format, activities in the 2009 Propaganda Week
were “unprecedented (qiansuo weiyou)” and “created a very good public opinion
environment (lianghao de yulun fenwei) for the implementation of the National
IPR Strategy.”29
Various media outlets play active roles during and outside of the annual IPR
Propaganda Week. Even before the IPR strategy was officially promulgated, head
of the SIPO had argued that the very first step to implement the strategy was to
“further strengthen IPR propaganda and education” by “making full use of
television, newspapers, and other media.” 30 The Propaganda Week always
involves the release of IPR information through press conferences and the
publication of governmental reports. In addition to intense coverage of various
promotional and educational activities, media involvement can take many forms.
In 2017, a provincial IPR administration produced a four-episode documentary on
the development of intellectual property in China. Entitled “The Nation's Ultimate
Weapon (guo zhi liqi),” it was premiered on TV on April 26, the World
26

Ibid.
Qishan Wang, “No More Chinese Knock-offs,” Wall Street Journal (Eastern Edition),
June 17, 2008.
28 Yu Wang and Qun Li, “Linian Quanguo Zhishi Chanquan Xuanchuanzhou Huodong
Saomiao [A Scan of the IPR Propaganda Week in Each Year],” SIPO.gov.cn, 2013,
http://www.sipo.gov.cn/sipo2013/mtjj/2013/201304/t20130418_792192.html.
29 Ibid.
30 Jingchuan Wang, “Working Report to the National Patent Conference,” in IPR Yearbook
2005 ed. IPR Yearbook Editorial Board (Beijing: Zhishi Chanquan Chubanshe, 2005), 19.
27
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Intellectual Property Day and the last day of the Propaganda Week.
With the promulgation of the national IPR strategy, the notion of “IPR culture
(zhishi chanquan wenhua)” emerged in official discourse. The Strategy Outline of
2008 listed IPR culture as one of its four short-term goals, expecting to see “the
general increase of IPR awareness (zhshi chanquan yishi) and the preliminary
formation of IPR cultural environment (zhishi chanquan wenhua fenwei)” in five
years. For that purpose, China’s strategic focus (zhanlue zhongdian) needs to be
on “the nurturing of IPR culture (peiyu zhishi chanquan wenhua).” Five years
later, several agencies governing IPR, cultural industry, education, and commerce
jointly issued the Several Opinions on the Strengthening of IPR Cultural
Construction in 2013 (hereinafter “Several Opinions”), which claimed that the
goal of “preliminary formation of IPR cultural environment” had been achieved.
Nevertheless, the Several Opinions called for “massive efforts to construct (dali
jianshe) IPR culture” because it still could not meet the requirement of the
national IPR strategy.

Engineering an instrumental IPR culture
In official accounts, the IPR culture that the national strategy seeks to promote
and nurture is explicitly instrumental and serves to regulate behaviors and
promote compliance with the law. Before formally being made into the Strategy
Outline of 2008, the notion of IPR culture had appeared in a number of
semi-governmental and scholarly occasions. Its discussion reached a high water
mark in 2007, when the SIPO hosted the China IPR Culture Forum. The forum
attracted attendees from governmental agencies, universities, research institutions,
state-owned companies, and private businesses from all over China. Presentations
in the forum were later edited into a book, which remains a leading publication on
IPR culture in China today. The SIPO’s Associate Director (also the editor of the
book) penned the first chapter “IPR Culture and the National IPR Strategy.” It
defines culture as “a powerful, invisible force…that influences the formation of
social norms and ethics rules…results in self-discipline of ideas and
behaviors…and guides the direction of social development."31 Another SIPO
31

Binghui Lin, “Zhishi Chanquan Wenhua yu Guojia Zhishi Chanquan Zhanlue [IPR
Culture and National IPR Strategy],” in 2007 Zhongguo Zhishi Chanquan Wenhua
Luntan Lunwenji [Collection of Articles from 2007 China IPR Culture Forum], ed.

1
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official and a leading advocate of IPR culture argued that IPR culture is about
values and “plays an indispensable role in the making and implementation of the
law.”32 To reinforce the inner-agency consensus, a third SIPO official argued that
IPR culture is “soft power” that “impacts or determines a social group’s opinions
and activities.” 33 The Several Opinions of 2013 officially recognized the
instrumental role of IPR culture by stating: “IPR culture…is an important
thoughts-and-awareness guarantee (sixiang yishi baozhang) of the implementation
of the national IPR strategy and the construction of a creative nation.”
The construction of IPR culture is a governmental project. The Strategy
Outline specifically states that IPR culture is “guided by the government,
supported by (state-owned) news media, and with extensive participation by the
public (zhengfu zhudao, xinwen meiti zhicheng, shehui gongzhong guangfan
canyu).” The Several Opinions of 2013 stipulates that the Communist Party’s
Central Propaganda Department (zhongxuanbu) and the SIPO are to take the lead
in IPR cultural construction, and are responsible for incorporating IPR into
cultural and propaganda work at various levels of local governments. It needs to
be noted that there is nothing strange in Chinese politics and media to carry out
massive propaganda campaigns to promote certain causes. The Communist
Party’s press philosophy emphasizes the “mass line,” i.e. “from the masses, to the
masses.” It is paternalistic and does not tolerate independent voices, and in
practice “the two-way mass line model has been severely lopsided in favor of
top-down communication.” 34 The Leninist propagandist employment of the
media, with some transformations, remains a defining feature of Chinese media

Binghui Lin (Beijing: Zhishi Chanquan Chubanshe, 2007), 2.
32 Weiye Ma, “Lun Wenhua he Zhishi Chanquan Wenhua [On Culture and IPR Culture],”
in 2007 Zhongguo Zhishi Chanquan Wenhua Luntan Lunwenji [Collection of Articles
from 2007 China IPR Culture Forum], ed. Binghui Lin (Beijing: Zhishi Chanquan
Chubanshe, 2007), 24.
33 Xiucheng Han, “Zhishi Chanquan Wenhua yu Wenhua Ruanshili [IPR Culture and
Cultural Soft Power],” in 2007 Zhongguo Zhishi Chanquan Wenhua Luntan Lunwenji
[Collection of Articles from 2007 China IPR Culture Forum], ed. Binghui Lin (Beijing:
Zhishi Chanquan Chubanshe, 2007), 28.
34 Yuezhi Zhao, Media, Market, and Democracy in China: Between the Party Line and the
Bottom Line (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1998), 30.
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today. 35 Inheriting the mass propaganda toolkit from pufa campaigns, IPR
propaganda is carried out in a top-down manner with prefixed definitions on what
IPR is and what it does, expecting to indoctrinate them so as to promote
compliance with the law.
Meanwhile, IPR propaganda has unique features compared with pufa
campaigns. National pufa programs were launched in the mid-1980s, early in the
Market Reform when a large number of laws and regulations were promulgated in
a short time span. They were not upgrades of older codes but part of a new
governance structure that relied on a stable bureaucracy and market-oriented rules
(in contrast to mass movements and politics during the Cultural Revolution).
Public legal education was thus an essential move to bring the Chinese population
on board of social and political changes in the reform era, and it was in this sense
that even semi-illiterate peasants could find pufa relevant and accessible. 36
Dedicated IPR propaganda campaigns, however, developed alongside the
deepening of market reform and China’s integration with capitalist global political
economy. Major IPR statutes were all promulgated in the 1980s and were by no
means new law in the 2000s (as in contrast to the first pufa program in 1986).
They were cloaked under prior and broader reform measures instead of making
groundbreaking statements of political U-turns. Compared with pufa campaigns
that always place the Constitution at the core, China’s IPR propaganda often
appears apolitical and frames IPR as universally beneficial.
The notion of IPR culture, by affirming the legitimacy of cultural
commodification and the cornerstone role of intellectual property, shows a
dramatic breakaway from the pre-reform concept of culture as political and
revolutionary. For example, the Strategy Outline’s opening gambit is to claim
intellectual property to be “the foundational system to cultivate and utilize
knowledge resources (kaifa he liyong zhishi ziyuan de jiben zhidu).” Framing
knowledge as a resource to be “cultivated” and “utilized,” the Strategy Outline set
the tone of China’s intellectual property policy by casting culture and information
out of the political and social sphere. It goes on to state that IPR defines people’s
Yuezhi Zhao, “Sustaining and Contesting Revolutionary Legacies in Media and
Ideology,” in Mao's Invisible Hand: The Political Foundations of Adaptive Governance
in China, eds. Sebastian Heilmann and Elizabeth J. Perry (Cambridge: Harvard
University Asian Center, 2011).
36 Xia, “The Origin.”
35
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“rights” and regulates “relations of (economic) interest (liyi guanxi)” in the
“creation and utilization of knowledge and other information,” thus affirming the
legitimacy of private control and the market mechanism in the cultural and
information sector. Likewise, official accounts of IPR culture often adopt
commodified definitions of culture and information in a matter-of-fact manner.
According to the Several Opinions of 2013, in the ideal IPR cultural environment,
people “respect knowledge, advocate innovation, and abide by law honestly and
in good faith (zunzhong zhishi, chongshang chuangxin, chengxin shoufa).” By
equating IPR with social morals and norms, it conceals the private nature of
intellectual property and precludes inquiries into the legitimacy of, and
alternatives to, the market in the realm of culture and knowledge.

The conflict-ridden cultural work of intellectual property
China’s embrace of IPR is a developmental strategy formulated under specific
historical circumstances. The Market Reform initiated at a time when large-scale
privatization swept through major Western countries, and when informational and
cultural sectors became the propellant of global economy.37 Meanwhile, after
centuries of growth and transformation, laws of intellectual property became the
major form of market regulation in commercial media and technology sectors.38
China’s reform step-by-step opened Chinese market and reinserted China into the
global capitalist political economy. With the inflow of Western goods and
investment, as well as the growth of an export-oriented economy reliant on
Western markets, China became susceptible to Western influence and threats.
When the U.S. started to pressure other countries on IPR matters through trade
threats in the mid-1980s and after,39 China was forced to make concessions and
to fast-track to adopt global IPR rules. China’s national IPR strategy, taking shape
37

David Harvey, A Brief History of Neoliberalism (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005);
Dan Schiller, How to Think About Information? (Urbana, IL: University of Illinois Press,
2007); Yuezhi Zhao, “After Mobile Phones, What? Re-embedding the Social in China's
‘Digital Revolution’,” International Journal of Communication 1, (2007), 92-120.
38 Christopher May and Susan K. Sell, Intellectual Property Rights: A Critical History
(Boulder: Lynne Rienners Publishers, 2006).
39 Susan K. Sell, Private Power, Public Law: The Globalization of Intellectual Property
Rights (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003).
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in the 2000s, came after China’s turn to follow the informationized growth model
headed by the U.S.40 and the recognition of culture as a strategic industrial
sector.41 The ascendance of IPR in China’s economic and developmental policy is
China’s choice (albeit among limited options) to follow the mainstream growth
path in the capitalist West. Against this historical context, China’s promotion of
IPR manifests the cultural work of the Chinese state trying to keep pace with the
global IPR regime. It is a conflict-ridden project entangled in the frictions and
collaborations between the Chinese state, transnational capital, domestic media
and technology corporations, and various forms of social resistance to intellectual
property.
A notable and unique feature of IPR propaganda in China is its wide
engagement with Western ideas and institutions, rarely (if ever) seen in China’s
other governmental media campaigns or pufa programs. A well-known researcher
based in the U.S. argues that China’s political culture, which emphasizes the
control of ideas rather than the promotion of creation and communication, is a key
reason for the lack of effective IPR protection.42 Some other researchers attribute
enforcement issues to Chinese people’s mindset, arguing that “respect for property
must be a notion well-engraved not only in law but in the minds of political
leaders and citizens alike.”43 This seems to be a widely held belief in the industry,
and a number of U.S. companies consider “investment in IPR awareness, training,
and education to be a major part of their companies’ ‘coping strategy’” for
China’s IPR situation.44 Indeed, a few months after the Strategy Outline was
promulgated in 2008, Microsoft launched an annual Global Anti-Piracy Day, “a
simultaneous launch of education initiatives and enforcement actions” that
“include intellectual property awareness campaigns, engagements with partner
businesses, educational forums, local law enforcement training, and new legal
actions against alleged software counterfeiters and pirates.”45 The press release
Yuezhi Zhao and Dan Schiller, “Dances with Wolves? China’s Integration into Digital
Capitalism,” Info 3, no. 2 (2001), 137-151.
41 Michael Keane, Created in China: The Great New Leap Forward (London: Routledge,
2007), 81.
42 Alford, To Steal a Book.
43 Oksenberg, Potter, and Abnett, “Advancing Intellectual Property Rights,” 9.
44 Ibid., 26-27.
45 Microsoft, “Microsoft Announces Global Anti-Piracy Day to Highlight Collaborative
40
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from Microsoft China disclosed a number of training and enforcement activities
conducted “in cooperation with the Global Anti-Piracy Day,” including Microsoft
providing training sessions to law enforcement officers and “active assistance (jiji
xiezhu)” to enforcement raids and investigations.46 In January 2012, Microsoft
China launched a three-day activity to promote software copyright protection. In
collaboration with a number of computer markets in large cities, Microsoft set up
information booths, provided on-site consultations, hung anti-piracy banners in
computer stores, and distributed pamphlets and other materials to consumers and
sellers in the markets.47
Meanwhile, China has been actively pursuing a pro-IPR national image on
the international stage. Starting in 2013, every IPR Propaganda Week receives a
pre-recorded video presentation by the World Intellectual Property Organization’s
(WIPO) Director General Francis Gurry. In 2017, the Propaganda Week held a
summit forum (gaoceng luntan) and enlisted a number of speakers from the
WIPO, foreign governments, as well as major Western companies such as
Qualcomm. As a matter of fact, the World Intellectual Property Day, on which
China’s IPR Propaganda Week is based, was adopted by the WIPO at the
suggestion of China and Algeria. In China’s 1999 proposal, the head of SIPO
stated that the World Intellectual Property Day was to “further promote the
awareness of intellectual property protection, expand the influence of intellectual
property protection across the world, urge countries to publicize and popularize
intellectual property protection laws and regulations, enhance the public legal
awareness of intellectual property rights, encourage invention-innovation
activities in various countries and strengthen international exchange in the
Efforts to Protect Customers and Partners Around the World From Software Piracy and
Counterfeiting,”
Microsoft.com,
2008,
https://news.microsoft.com/2008/10/20/microsoft-announces-global-anti-piracy-day-to-hi
ghlight-collaborative-efforts-to-protect-customers-and-partners-around-the-world-from-s
oftware-piracy-and-counterfeiting/#LSMevAUu1rIk0Sqm.97.
46 Microsoft, “Weiran Sheli Quanqu Daobanri [Microsoft Establishes Global Anti-piracy
Day],” Microsoft.com, 2008, http://news.microsoft.com/zh-cn/微软设立全球反盗版宣传
日，保护全球各地的消费/#sm.0001nqy75or6hetoq2a1unkzsbf2o.
47 “Weiruan Xinnian Zhengban Ruanjian Xuanchuang Hongdong Qidong [Microsoft Kicks
Off
New
Year
Publicity
on
Authentic
Software],”
CNET,
2012,
http://www.cnetnews.com.cn/2012/0109/2073839.shtml.
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intellectual property field.”48 In 2008, China made another effort to promote a
pro-IPR national image right after the promulgation of the Strategy Outline and
shortly before the Beijing Olympics. During his trip to the U.S. for the fourth
round of Strategic Economic Dialogue between the two countries, then Vice
Premier Wang Qishan published an article on the Wall Street Journal. Entitled
“No More Chinese Knock-offs,” Wang introduced China’s national IPR strategy
to the readers of the newspaper. He informed them that China will “launch
extensive educational programs among the public to further encourage innovation,
promote such moral standards as honesty and credibility, and to condemn
plagiarism, piracy and counterfeiting,” as well as to “raise people's IPR awareness
and foster an innovation-friendly IPR culture in which knowledge and integrity
are respected and laws and regulations are complied with.”49
China’s extensive engagement with Western ideas and corporations in IPR
promotion takes place against the Chinese state’s complicated relations with both
transnational capital and domestic market powers. First, China’s IPR development
initialized as an elite-driven project which aims at “learning from the West,”50
and “mainstream” Western ideological positions and industrial practices of IPR
have had profound impact on policy and lawmaking in China. In spite of intense
IPR frictions between China and major Western countries, China has seldom, if
ever, launched serious challenges to the legitimacy of intellectual property. IPR
problems have always been addressed on the basis of, rather than up against,
Western frameworks of IPR. Wang’s article well illustrates this point by
reassuring readers of the Wall Street Journal that China shares the same
understanding of IPR.51 In another interesting case of China-West friction, the
Chinese government put Qualcomm under an anti-trust investigation, which
resulted in a staggering $975 million fine in 2015. However, given the size and
potential of China’s market, this was indeed a “lenient approach” that “left the
company’s [Qualcomm’s] business model intact” and provided “a stepping-stone
Ying Jiang, “Proposal By The State Intellectual Property Office, The People's Republic
Of
China,”
1999,
https://web.archive.org/web/20031222105639/http://www.wipo.int/documents/en/docum
ent/govbody/wo_gb_ga/ga24_8.htm.
49 Wang, “No More Chinese Knock-offs.”
50 Han, “How the Copyright Law Was (Not) Made.”
51 Wang, “No More Chinese Knock-offs.”
48
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toward full participation in the Chinese market.”52 It manifests conflicts between
China’s technonationalist agendas and transnational capital, but more importantly
also highlights a consensus regarding the platform to resolve such conflicts: an
IPR-based market and regulatory model. In the face of various resistances to the
global IPR regime, it makes perfect sense for them to work together on the
promotion of intellectual property.
In contrast, domestic media and technology companies have yet to play a
high-profile role in IPR propaganda, which needs to be attributed to their uneasy
situation with regard to intellectual property. On the one hand, many state-owned
corporations as well as private businesses have been under fire in Western
criticisms of IPR offenses. For example, China Central Television (CCTV),
China’s flagship TV network and the Communist Party’s mouthpiece, has been
singled out by the European Union Trade Commissioner for not paying royalties
to European copyright holders.53 The e-commerce giant Alibaba has always been
criticized for not doing enough to curb the sale of counterfeit goods on its online
shopping platform Taobao. 54 Considering that China’s IPR promotional
campaigns aim at not only promoting awareness and compliance but also
projecting a pro-IPR image of China for the Western audience, it is more
important to craft a flawless, coherent narrative to showcase China’s
achievements than to remind the audience of unresolved frictions. In the Summit
Forum during the 2017 Propaganda Week, the only keynote speaker from the
industry was from Qualcomm (in spite of the antitrust investigation of the
company in 2015). Keynote speeches representing China’s voices (apart from
governmental officials) were from scholars and writers, individuals with clean
records of IPR offenses. Representatives of domestic businesses were present, but
were seated with the audience.
Nevertheless, China’s state-owned and private businesses are rapidly
Yu Hong, “Pivot to Internet Plus: Molding China’s Digital Economy for Economic
Restructuring?” International Journal of Communication 11, (2017), 1495.
53 “China: EU's Mandelson Says PRC Broadcasters Not Paying Royalties,” BBC
Monitoring World Media - Supplied by BBC Worldwide Monitoring, November 8, 2006.
54 Yue Wang and Paul Armstrong, “Is Alibaba Doing Enough to Fight Fakes,” Forbes.com,
2017,
https://www.forbes.com/sites/ywang/2017/03/10/is-alibaba-doing-enough-to-fight-fakes/
#26ca96e25587.
52
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preparing themselves to benefit from IPR and to actively participate in IPR
promotion. Having gone through multiple copyright challenges, CCTV has been
forcefully reforming its production management to be copyright-compatible.55
Given the enormous production and market resources it controls, a
copyright-ready CCTV will have much to gain from IPR promotion and
enforcement. Meanwhile, private Internet companies have made remarkable
progress in IPR management56 and have actively engaged in the promotion of
intellectual property in a number of ways. In an interesting case in 2014, an IPR
executive in a private technology company co-authored a novel with a staff
worker at the SIPO’s Propaganda Department. Based on the IPR executive’s
career experience, the novel told a story about how a Chinese IT company grew
from being patent-less to aggressively employing IPR tools to compete with
market rivals. Titled “Ferocious Patents (zhuanli xiongmeng),” the novel quickly
became a bestseller after publication, topping the bestseller list and surpassing
books by well-known popular writers. Nevertheless, it remains to be seen how
and when Chinese domestic companies may play front-seat roles in China’s
endeavor to upgrade the “Made in China” brand to the “Created in China”
imaginary and to put up a pro-IPR stance.57
At the same time, IPR promotional projects often show an ambiguous attitude
toward social resistance to intellectual property. Two cases highlight the point. In
2006, a parody video that mocked a blockbuster movie went viral on the Chinese
Internet. Widely known as Mantou, the popular video used clips from the movie
Wuji and retold the story in a derisive tone. When the movie director threatened to
sue for copyright infringement, the widely recognized controversy triggered an
intellectual property debate. On the one hand, research by legal and media
professionals quickly found that the video would be deemed fair use in Western
countries, including the U.S., but it was almost certainly an infringement under
Dong Han, “Copyrighting Media Labor and Production: A Case of Chinese Television,”
Television & New Media 13, no. 4 (2012), 283-306.
56 “World Intellectual Property Day: BAT's Patent Approval Rates Near 70%, with 360 Far
in the Lead [Shijie Zhishi Chauquan Ri: BAT Zhuanli Shouquanlv Jin 70%; 360 Yaoyao
Lingxian],”
Xinhuanet,
2016,
http://news.xinhuanet.com/tech/2016-04/26/c_128933713.htm.
57 Fan Yang, Faked in China: Nation Branding, Counterfeit Culture, and Globalization
(Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2015).
55
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the stringent Chinese law. On the other hand, Internet users sided overwhelmingly
with the video since the copyright controversy had come to symbolize the conflict
between the grassroots and the elite.58 At one of those rare opportunities in which
IPR comes to the center of media and public attention spontaneously, the
government had no intention to disseminate legal knowledge, educate the people,
or draw from the masses (as the mass line principle would require). When asked
about the case in a press conference, an official from the National Copyright
Administration refused to comment and only said that the court would rule on it.59
During the IPR Propaganda Week of 2006, no efforts were made to utilize the
popular case of Mantou to popularize the law.
In 2008, another copyright controversy swept through the Chinese Internet. A
university teaching staff who produced a plug-in (shanhuchong, or coral worm)
for a popular messaging application (QQ) was arrested under criminal charges.
His arrest triggered a widespread revolt online for a number of reasons. First,
plug-ins were popular on the Chinese Internet at the time. They did not change the
original software codes but worked with them to provide different functions, thus
had been thought to be free from copyright problems. Second, the company that
owned QQ, Tencent, had previously worked with the defendant to use
shanhuchong’s popularity to promote QQ. Third, the arrest and later trial of the
defendant had many problems. Unverified stories online claimed that Tencent, a
Chinese cyber giant, manipulated the case from behind the scene. Media coverage
of the trial was minimal and controlled, and personal accounts published online
implicated that the trial was unfair. In spite of online rallies in support of the
defendant, as well as analyses from legal professionals that insisted on his
innocence, the court handed down a guilty verdict with a three-year sentence.60
Before the ruling, a local TV network produced and aired a documentary that
framed the defendant as a criminal. Entitled “Coral Worm Into Flame (puhuo de
shanhuchong),” it drew a parallel between the plug-in producer and a moth that
Dake Zhu, “Yige Songruan de Huayu Mantou [A Soft, Discursive Mantou],” China
Newsweek, no. 8 (2006), 28-29.
59 Hongyi Bai, “Shui Dong le Shui de Mantou? [Who Moved Whose Mantou?],” China
Newsweek, no. 8 (2006), 30-31.
60 Sina Tech, “Shanhuchong QQ Zuozhe bei Pan Ruyu Sannian Fakuan 120 Wan Yuan
[Creator of Shanhuchong Sentenced to Three Years in Jail and Fined 1.2 Million Yuan],”
SINA.com, 2008, http://tech.sina.com.cn/i/2008-03-20/14512090396.shtml.
58
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headed toward self-destruction. With very little coverage of the case by
mainstream media, the TV documentary stood out as the major official account of
the controversy.
In these two cases, the Chinese state reacted differently from the case of
Shanzhai cell phones. While official media coverage of bandit cell phones shows
the state striving to “reposition itself in relation to Shanzhai so as to re-emerge a
legitimate leader for ‘the people’,”61 the cases of Mantou and coral worm suggest
that the state’s repositioning may be inconsistent, incoherent, and conditioned by
case-specific contexts. First, by competing with international brands, Shanzhai
cell phones coincided with the state’s technonationalist agenda, which lent
themselves to the state’s effort to “re-direct their [the people’s] energy toward
‘proper’ national ends.”62 In the cases of Mantou and coral worm, however, IPR
holders were leading Chinese media and IT corporations (China Film Group
Corporation and Tencent, respectively), both symbols of Chinese entrepreneurial
prowess. As a matter of fact, China Film Group Corporation (CFGC) had sought
to create a nationalist aura for Wuji, target of Mantou’s critical remarks, by
marketing it as a movie to “represent China (daibiao zhongguo)” to compete in
the Academy Awards.63 Therefore, it might be difficult for the state to steer the
controversies toward a nationalist agenda in the same way as bandit cell phones.
In addition, the cases of Mantou and coral worm demonstrate aspects of IPR
promotions which are not readily visible in well-orchestrated annual campaigns.
In the case of Mantou, state-owned media outlets including digital media
platforms hosted heated debates and served as key venues for popular criticisms
on intellectual property, cultural industrial policy, and China’s social polarization.
It posed a sharp contrast to not only the ambiguous stance of copyright officials,
but also the unified voice found in annual propaganda campaigns. The absence of
Mantou in formal governmental statements and propaganda campaigns suggests
that state propagandist maneuvers tend to marginalize and downplay bottom-up
challenges, rather than to tackle them head-on. It also shows that the Leninist
propagandist media control is neither total nor round-the-clock. Engaging in full
61
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gear only in critical moments and on critical subjects, e.g. during the annual IPR
Propaganda Week, it manifests the power of the state apparatus as well as its
limitations. The case of coral worm, on the other hand, shows a complicit
collaboration between propaganda media and domestic private capital, as well as
fissures between local and national propagandist agendas. Though Tencent denied
its involvement in the case, it was no doubt the major beneficiary of the
prosecution of coral worm. Active involvement of local governmental media
points to a high-level correlation between IPR propaganda and private market
interests. Meanwhile, however, Shenzhen TV station’s aggressive stance is very
different from national media and governmental organs, which often remain
ambiguous and silent regarding bottom-up resistance to the IPR regime.

Conclusion
To popularize an officially sanctioned understanding of the legal system is critical
for the Chinese Communist Party to legitimize its rule in post-socialist
conditions.64 Meanwhile, IPR promotion in China also strives to serve specific
economic policy and regulatory goals. Born out of pufa campaigns, IPR
propaganda inherits the Communist Party’s long-term press philosophy that seeks
to use media to shape worldviews and mobilize the masses for social and political
causes. Thus, present-day promotional campaigns have important connections
with the pre-reform era. On the other hand, however, messages crafted and
disseminated in today’s propaganda campaigns are very different from
anti-capitalist, anti-imperialism messages of old times. As part of the ideological
shifts in the reform era, how easy or difficult they fit with a media system and
philosophy that took shape in China’s revolutionary and socialist past can shed
important light on the nature of Chinese media and social transformation both
before and during the market reform.
China’s IPR propaganda campaigns show little conscious effort to reconcile
Chinese media’s anti-capitalist past with the promotion of a property system that
undergirds the contemporary capitalist political economy. While China’s
revolutionary past has in essence been in pursuit of an alternative, non-capitalist
developmental path,65 by internalizing the logic of the global IPR regime, China’s
64
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IPR propaganda has rendered China’s development as a catch-up process on the
same route as Western industrialized countries. Thus Vice Premier Qishan Wang’s
Wall Street Journal article serves as a case in point by arguing that: “On IPR,
China has managed to accomplish in 30 years what took Western-developed
countries more than 100 years,” and that China “still has a long way to go before
it can catch up with the U.S.”66 Absent from Wang’s statement is the possibility
of an “alternative account of China’s rise” that may destabilize or challenge the
power relations of the global capitalist political economy.67 Ironically, the image
of being a “catcher-up” will in the long run work against China by placing China
at “an elementary stage on a universal developmental track.” 68 Under the
dominant discourse of the global IPR regime, it is “economic and political
prowess” that defines and produces creativity.69 As a follower, China will always
be subject to the discursive power of the image of a copycat. China’s IPR cultural
project, if always on the heels of the West and distancing itself from grassroots
dynamics of resistance and meaning-making, will only run against the
developmental goal that policymakers envision.
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